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THE BEST LAID PLANS OFT GO ASTRAY: 
The Case of Winnipeg 
by 
L 1 oyd Ax•"Jorthy 
I1HRODUCTION 
The call for urban reform has been heard with great frequency 
in Canada over the last six or seven years. Of more consequence 
is the fact that some reform has actually occurred. 
Mind you, there has not been the earth-shattering upheavals in 
the urban class structure as desired by some vociferous, 
socialist critics of the city. 1 Nor has there been the ascension 
Of direct control by the people as seen by certain urban 
t . 2 roman 1cs. But there have been a number of important changes 
in the political systems of our cities- nev·t political alignments, 
a range of new issues, some change in public attitudes, alterations 
in government organization, and new policies and programs. 
1. See J. Lorimer, The Real World of City Politics, James, 
Le1t!is, Samuels, Toronto, 1971. 
2. See Boyce Richardson, The Future of Canadian Cities, New 
Press, Toronto, 1972. 
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The time is at hand, therefore, to ask questions about these 
reforms. Hhat has been occurring? How effective have they 
been? Hhat are the consequences? Our reading of the history 
of earlier urban reform movements should show us just hov1 
inexact an art or science reform can be, \'lith good intentions 
oft go astray and ending up with unwelcome results. 3 So to 
assay what has been happening to various refor111 efforts in 
Canadian cities thus far may provide some correctional guidance 
for the future. 
REFOR!Yl OF LOCAL GOVERNt·1ENT IN tHNNIPEG 
One of the major currer.ts of reform and one that is generally 
wide accepted by politicans and administrators who normally 
are not enthusiastic about the topic of reform, is the re-
organization of local government. One must pay tribute to the 
generation of political scientists and oublic administrators 
who over the past two or three decades have flogged the notion 
that cities have outgrown their traditional boundaries, and that 
regional government is the only way to achieve effective delivery 
of services and good planning. Their message has been received 
3. For an interesting view of the earlier urban reform 
move111ents see Paul Rutherford ed., Savina the Canadian City, 
University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 197 . 
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mainly by provincial decision-makers, for there is nary a 
province of Canada that has not embarked upon some form of re-
organizing and restructuring of local government. It has 
become almost a compulsory act of membershio in the provincial 
club to pay homage at least to the need for restructuring 
municipal institutions. 
Perhaps the most significant initiative yet taken in this area 
of reform has been the nev,f City of Hi nni peg Act that came into 
effect on January 1 , 1972. i~hil e the ori gina l scheme 
was substantially amended by the ~1anitoba legislature in 1977, 
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~Jinnipeg's Unicity has been heralded ~ and rightly so, as one of the most 
innovative efforts at local government reorganization in 
Canada, if not North America. The reason for such attention 
stems from the fact that this reorganization was aimed not 
only at providing a more effective form of urban regional 
government, but it also sought to decentralize the operation 
of government and give more access to the people. In short, 
it was designed to centralize and democratize at the same time; 
to combine the traditional concerns about fragmentation and lack 
of comprehensive planning with the newer fashion of trying to 
make the city more democratic. 
The Winnipeg case is a useful one to examine therefore, because 
it represents one of the very best examples of one distinct 
area of reform thinking - namely, that the way to achieve im-
provements in cities is to change their form of government. 
If the problem is bad housing, poor transportation, burdensome 
taxation, non-involvement of citizens, then the way to change 
is to provide new structures, organization and administration. 
It is assumed that the institution of government is the 
determining variable in affecting the outcome for cities, as 
opposed to looking at the political process or the economic 
and social structure of urban society. The soundness of this 
assumption vii 11 therefore be tested in this particular treat-
ment of the reform of Uinnipeg•s city government. 
PRESSURE FOR CHANGE 
During the 1960 1 S, Winnipeg had undergone a frustrating experience 
vii th a ~1etropo 1 i tan form of government. Some success had been 
achieved in the building of public works and transportation; 
but the hallmark of Winnipeg•s Metro government was a consistent 
internecine warfare between the t·1ayor and Council of the City 
of ~·Ji nni peg and the counci 11 ors and administrators of the ~1etro 
Corporation. '"Jhen t1etro released a plan for downto'tm improvement, 
city fathers from Vii nni peg ~tmul d soon announce their own pet 
schemes. 
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Fortunately, Winnipeg during this period was relatively 
slow growing and did not noticeably suffer under the political 
stalemate other than creating a backlog of unattended inner 
city social problems. The Provincial Government under Premier 
Duff Roblin, however, was under some pressure to cope with the 
situation from the media, and, one might assume, building 
development interests which found it difficult to gain approval 
on development plans. Therefore the province in 1966 established 
a Boundary Commission Nhich was to look into problems of l~innipeg 1 s 
local government. The Commission took its time and, in 1969 
before it had reported, the Provincial Government changed hands. 
Ed Schreyer and the New Democrats came to poHer with reform of 
local government as one of their campaign pledges. 4 
Entrusted with the job of developing a plan to fulfill their 
campaign pledge was Finance ~1inister Saul Cherniak, a former 
f·1etro Co unci 11 or who was known to favour the ide a of tota 1 
amalgamation. These pro-arralgamation views were shared by 
Sidney Green, a strong man in the Cabinet and also a former 
~~etro Councillor. Arrayed against these b'lo powerful ministers 
of Education, who were former suburban local politicans and 
4. For a detailed history of this period of preparation for 
the nev1 Act, see Thomas Axworthy, The Politics of Innovation-
Future City Series Number 2, Institute of Urban Studies, 
University of Hi nni peg, 1972. 
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against amalgamation. Therefore within the NDP Cabinet itself 
were the makings of conflict and ultimate comcromise. 
An equa 11 y potent po 1 i ti ca 1 factor was the incumbent Mayor of 
Winnipeg at the time, Steve Juba, an outspoken foe of any kind 
of federation. Juba was not to be taken lightly. He Nas a 
very popular mayor and enjoyed a strong follm'ling amongst the 
working class voters. Therefore, any proposal would have to 
take due note of Mr. Juba 1 s position. 
Rather than relying upon a Tory-appointed Commission, the new 
government sought architects for a local government blueprint 
from Toronto. ~1eyer Bro~;~mstone, a Toronto political scientist 
and former Deputy 1'1inister of t~unicipal Affairs in the Douglas 
government of Saskatchewan was the chief designer and he employed 
other Toronto-based consultants to help. In a remarkably short 
period of time they produced a government l~hi te Paper5 which set 
fontard \'lhat appeared to be an ingenious and creative solution 
to both the institutional problems and political realities of 
the Winnipeg situation. 
5. See Proposals for Urban Reorganization in the Greater 
Winnipeg Area, Government of t·1anitoba, December, 1970. 
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WHITE PAPER PROPOSAL 
At the centre of the provincial proposals was the total unific-
ation of Hinnipeg. There Has to be one council, one administrative 
structure, and one tax base. This would presumably eliminate 
problems of fragmentation in decision-making, competition 
between muni ci pa 1 i ties for industry, i nequi ties in property tax 
rates, and allow for a comprehensive management of urban grov1th. 
To consolidate this trend toward unification, the Hhite Paper 
proposed a highly centralized administrative system. Council 
vwuld have three standing committees: Finance, Public \.1/orks, 
and Environment, and a central coordinating committee called 
Executive Policy Committee whose membership included the ~~ayor, 
Deputy Mayor, Committee Chairman, and three councillors at large. 
This was paralleled on the administration's side by three 
departments, of Finance, Pub 1 i c ~4orks, and Environment, each 
headed by a Commissioner and a Chief Commissioner all of whom 
together comprised a Board of Commissioners. The lynch pin to 
this system was the ~~1ayor who was to be elected by a majority 
on Council and would function as a chairman of the E.P.C. and 
and ad hoc members of the Board of Commissioners. 11\ cabinet 
style system \'las the obvious thought in these propositions 
wherein the ~1ayor, depending upon the confidence of a majority 
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on Council, would have to shape programmes and policies in the 
E.P.C. and Board of Commissioners that would deserve such 
support and thereby provide the basis for a policy-making process. 
The electoral base for this unified system was to be 48 (later 50) 
wards, each electing a single councillor. The purpose here was 
to insure that through the smaller wards (a population base of 
approximately 10,000) the voter would be able to maintain close 
touch with his or her elected representative. As well, the 
small wards would provide opportunity for various minority groups 
especially those in the inner city, to elect someone who would 
reflect their interests ~·something that did not happen in the 
previous electoral arrangement of large multiole-member wards. 
In the old system, voting strength resided in those middle class 
areas of the large wards and there was normally a higher voting 
turnout than in the lower-class areas. The language of the 
White Paper indicated a hope that this would lead to a greater 
sensitivity at the city level to problems of the inner city poor. 
To appease the suburban and counter criticisms over centralization, 
the new system Has to be organized into Community Committees. 
Each Community Committee \'las to be made up of three to four 
councillors and was to have power of local sunervision and be the 
arena of first hearing for zoning and planning initiatives. The 
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boundaries of the Community Committees were coterminous with 
the old municipalities, except that the old City of Hinnioeg 
was broken into five Community Committee areas. 
As a further gesture towards notions of local control and 
accountability, there was to be a Resident Advisory Group in 
each Community Committee area. Each year citizens were to 
elect Resident Advisers who were to meet at least monthly 
with councillors, receive pertinent information and tender 
tlie.ir advice on matters of local concern. This syste'm of 
Resident Advisers was out fon·Jard on institutional guarantee 
that orivate citizens \'JOuld have a say in local government and 
provide for a sensible degree of local control. 
Taken altogether, the proposals for reorganization sought to 
achieve l) a more equitable sharing of the tax burden; 2) a 
unified system of planning to deal with region-wide issues; 
3) a centralized system of executive decision-making and service 
delivery to achieve greater efficiencies; 4) an electoral 
system that would provide the opportunity for a greater range 
and variety of representation, particularly from heretofore 
ignored minority groups; 5) a degree of decentralization in the 
supervision of the administrative system; and, 6) an opportunity 
for involvement of private citizens in local government. In 
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addition to those goals, the Act also contained a number of 
interesting measures to be used in dealing with planning and 
development issues. For example, there was a requirement for 
environmental impact statements on major public works, an 
elaborate system of public hearings on zoning issues and prov-
ision for development of district plans and action area plans. 
In all, the \~hite Paper proposal rightly deserved the credit for 
being a major step in institutional reform on the local level. 
H<1PLE~1ENTATION 
Considering that it was such a major departure, the period of 
debate and implementation was remarkably short. The Hhite 
Paper was introduced in December of 1970, and by early summer of 
1971 it was passed into law. The elections for the new Council 
took place in the fall of the same year and the ne\11 unified 
system came into being on January 1, 1972.6 
Opposition to the scheme was of the expected variety but quite 
tame and ineffective. Critics, primarily suburban politicans, 
said it would be very costly and destroy the accountability 
and "grass roots" accessibility of local government. 
6. The speed of this should be contrasted with the British 
system where it took several years. See, Joyce Long, Alan Norton 
Setting up New Authorities, Charles Knight and Co., London, 1972. 
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Public meetings were held throughout those cities where 
Provincial Cabinet Ministers met those criticisms head on. The 
media were generally in favour; so vlere business interests and 
of course, t·1ayor Juba, with one exception. r,1ayor Juba did not 
1 ike the ide a of having the ~iayor elected from Co unci 1 and 
strongly argued for direct election. This view was strongly 
supported by the public. 7 Hhen the legislation came up for 
third and final reading, the government introduced an amendment 
allowing for direct election of the mayor for the first term. 
This change undid one of the important features of the original 
scheme, namely the idea of a Cabinet style executive. The 
change had marked repercussions on. the operation of the new 
system. 
THE RESULTS 
The reorganization of local government in t~innipeg had very 
different results from those originally envisioned by the 
P rovi nci a l Government. 8 The reason for the discrepancy was 
7. See Lloyd Axworthy, ed. , Future City: ,fl. Se 1 ecti on of 
Views on the Reorganization of Government in Greater Winnipeg, 
Institute of Urban Studies, University of t~innipeg, 1972. 
8. For a more extensive treatment of the first years of the 
new system in \Jinnipeg see Lloyd Ax\·JOrthy, James Cassidy, Unicity: 
The Transition (Future City Report Number 4), Institute of Urban 
Studies, University of Hinnipeg, 1974. 
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\IJas that legis 1 a tors overestimated the impact that structura 1 
reform can have in altering the decision-making dynamics of a 
city and they vastly underestimated the importance of the 
political process. 
This is not to say that some of the objectives of the unification 
were not achieved. Certainly from the outset the unified tax 
base eliminated the fiscal inequities that used to exist between 
municipalities. There have also been indications that the 
delivery of certain services benefited through a unified system. 
But, in the main, the structural changes had different and at 
times contradictory consequences from those envisioned and did 
not meet the goals set out in the Provincial Government 1 s White 
Paper. 
The Act did make provisions for the alterations by commissioning 
a pro vi nci a 1 revi e\'1 committee with a mandate to make recommendations 
for changes by 1976. In 1977, amendments to the Act underscored 
the inability of local government to cope with the unintended 
effects of institutional restructuring. Essentially, the size 
of Council was reduced to twenty-seven, primarily through the 
u rg i ng of the City, and the o l ann i ng provision of the ,1\ct 
\vas changed to give more central control. Although it would 
be premature to say the amendments to the Act indicated its 
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failure, they do imply that there were inherent difficulties in 
policy formulation and administrative processes. 
SUBURBAN DmUNANCE 
The reorganization of local government in Winnipeg brought about 
a consolidation of power into the hands of a very conservative, 
suburban, property-owner dominated coalition of political interests. 
People such as Jim Lorimer claim that the political system is 
irrelevant, that politicians are always in the hands of the 
property industry or some other economic elite. 9 Yet, the fact 
remains that politicians must be elected by substantial numbers 
of voters. If voters elect representatives v1hose interests do 
not coincide with those of development firms and banks, then there 
is a competing system of pOII!er to that of the property industry. 
One of the factors determining who gets elected and how they 
are elected is the electoral system which sets out boundaries, 
the franchise requirements and the procedures for selection. 
Equally influential is the organization base for election - whether 
there is a party system or a non-partisan system, and the 
financing of the candidates. Other factors intervene - the 
existence of certain key issues, the role of the media, the 
9. Lorimer, .2£· cit. 
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impact of outside forces, such as federal and provincial 
governments. A 11 these factors ~'tork together to determine 
the political alignments of a city. Those political alignments 
inturn play a major role in determining the policy and prograQ 
output of a city. Thus the design and construction of in-
stitutional features of local government have a distinct in-
fluence in determining who exercises povter in a city. 
In vJinnipeg, the reorganization altered the electoral and 
political arrangements of the city in such a way as to give 
advantage to those po 1 i ti ci ans 1:1ho vJere e 1 ected from middle 
income suburban residential constituencies that were in favour 
of anything that would keep property taxes low, promote business 
growth, encourage transportation to the fringes, and generally 
favour policies and expenditures of benefit to single family 
homeowners. This happened in part simply because the amalgamation 
of suburbs to central city occurred at a time '.>lfhen the suburban 
population had substantially exceeded that of the central older 
city. The small ward system awarded the majority of seats to 
the suburban areas, or to the residential oortions of the city 
which contained prosperous, single home families. The inner 
city areas were just simply outnumbered, and the political 
makeup of Council reflected this. One might consider how 
reform-minded Toronto City Council might be if it too were 
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unified and the majority of aldermen came from North York or 
Etobicoke. 
Combined with this numerical advantage is the way in which the 
electoral system, especially the alteration to direct election 
of the mayor, vtorked against the build-up of an effective party 
system. The mayor ran solo, as did each of the councillors. 
There was no requirement for a group to coalesce around a 
party label or a leader to present issues which might transcend 
the parochial economic or social interests of individual wards. 
In the v>tords of the political scientists, there was no interest 
aggregation, at least outside of Council itself. 
As a result, in the first election, a so-called non-oartisan 
group, the Independent Civic Election Committee, sv1ept the 
polls on nothing more than a platform of "good government" and 
"keep politics out of government." In effect \'Jhat they were 
really signalling to the electorate was that their candidate 
was non-NOP, non-radical, and endorsed by an upstanding group 
of community leaders. The NOP ran on a party label but without 
much tangible support from the provincial party and with no 
attractive leader running for the office of mayor to articulate 
issues and attract swing support. They won only a handful of 
seats in traditional NOP strongholds in working-class areas. 
15 
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There were also a few candidates elected independently on the 
strength of their own persona1ities. 10 
In the second civic election, held in the fall of 1974, the 
ICEC again won control of Council, again with no platform. The 
NDP managed to pick up a few seats. A new urban reform coalition 
that attacked the pro-development base of the ICEC ran several 
candidates, electing one and garnering 9% of the vote. 11 This 
reform group, like the NDP in the prior election, was handi-
capped because it did not run a mayoralty candidate who might 
have been able to focus on issues and generate some interest. 
This suggests that the parallel election of mayor and Council 
candidates, obviating the need to have a political group run 
on a common platform with a mayoralty candidate acting as chief 
spokesman, worked against the formation of strong, competing 
political groups. In turn, this meant that candidates ran 
primarily on appeal to specifically local ward level issues and 
gave advantage to local notables. VJith a stronger party system, 
a different kind of councillor might have been elected but a 
party system is difficult to form under such electoral rules. 
10. Results of 1971 election: ICEC-37, NDP-7, Independents-
5, Communist-1. 
11. Results of 1974 election: ICEC-30, NDP-10, 
Independents-8, CRC-1, Communist-!. 
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Under this system, Hayor Juba achieved an unbeatable political 
position. In both elections his vote was overwhelming in all 
parts of the city. In the first election he ran against a 
respectable candidate, Jack l~i 11 is, former chairman of ~1etro, 
and in the second election he ran against three virtual unknovms 
and again won by a landslide.12 
The nature of mayoralty election also influenced Juba 1 s 
operating style as chief executive of the city. He had his own 
independent power base, and because of his political popularity 
he could intimidate other politicians who didn 1 t want to be seen 
in his public disfavour. He didn't have to tailor his actions 
to be responsible to a majority on Council and often went off on 
personal tangents. He maintained a high political profile, 
usually through very colourful and flamboyant public relation 
ploys such as storming into the provincial legislature demanding 
that a public toilet not be built in one of the downtown parks 
as it would desecrate the memory of those war veterans for whom 
the park was named. 
This role of the mayor was further isolated through changes to 
the Act brought in at the 1977 session of the Legislature. The 
12. Mayoralty results: 1972 - Juba 139,174 




mayor was still elected directly, and candidates could compete 
for a council seat and a majority at the same time. But, by 
legislation the mayor was removed as chairman of the city•s 
Executive Policy Committee, the chief coordinating mechanism, 
and prevented from attending meetings of the chief administrative 
area, the Board of Commissioners. 
t'" 
These moves were widely interpreted as a v1ay of undermining the 
position of t1ayor Juba. In a surprise move, however, Juba ltlith-
drew from the race, leaving the field to two sitting councillors, 
Bill Norrie and Bob Steen. The winner was Steen and since taking 
office he has spent most of his time trying to gain or assert some 
autbority_~~ainst the I~EC dominated council. 
The overall impact of the t,1ayor operation ivas, under the Unicity 
system, to add to the fragmentation of authority and the lack of 
cohesiveness in Council. As a result many decisions were taken 
on a 11 log-rolling", "you scratch my back" basis. This again 
contributed to a situation where individual councillors were 
susceptible to entreaties from individual interest groups, as 
they had little protection or responsibility to party discipline. 
And, it made for a disjointed and ad hoc system of decision-
making. The only cohesion on Council came from the caucus 
arrangements of the different groups, particularly the ICEC 
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vJho usually voted en block for committee chairman and members 
of the Executive Policy Committee. But this was a very transitory 
unity. 
As a result the decisions of Council had two distinct traits. 
One, they v,;ere random and capricious, with very 1 i ttl e in the 
v1ay of consistent policy Ji recti on. Secondly, they did reflect 
the bias of the constitutuency of the ICEC, which on local 
matters was quite conservative, very pro-development, and pro-
suburban in turn. 
POLICY CONSEQUENCES 
The policy consequences of this political arrangement Nere not 
surprising. The new Hinnioeg City Council without exception 
had a record of suoport and subsidy for big dovmtown development 
schemes. The most notable and oft criticized decision was that 
regarding the Trizec Corporation for the development of the 
famous corner of Portage and ~1ain. The agreement was reached \'lith 
Trizec in a matter of a very few weeks and committed the City 
to an expensive purchase and the building of a 1,200 stall carpark, 
in return for very limited and open-ended commitments from the 
developer to build a hotel and tvm office towers. By 1978 it was 
evident that the building would not materialize according to the 
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. . 1 l 13 on g1 na p ans. 
This pro-development bias was accompanied by distinct hostility 
to provisions under the new Act requiring environmental impact 
studies and a substantial degree of citizen involvement in 
decision-making. The City, for the first bro years, didn 1 t even 
fulfill the imoact requirements and when forced to comply did 
so grudgingly and asked the Provincial Government to amend these 
provisions out of existence. In respect to citizen involvement, 
City Council neglected to discuss formally the role of citizens in 
the RAG, offered only limited financial support to the resident 
group, and persistently overturned the decisions of local 
community committees. 
The inner city of Hinnipeg in particular did not fare vJell by 
the new city organization, again in contradiction of the original 
expectation. Capita 1 \>lorks expenditures between suburbs and 
inner city ran as high as 7-1 in favour of the suburban areas. 
Transportation decisions were made on the basis of how quickly 
people could move from the downtown to the suburbs with little 
consideration for the health of the older neighbourhoods through 
which the new traffic flows. 
13. For a discussion of Trizec see David Walker - Unpublished 
Report, Institute of Urban Studies, Summer, 1978. 
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There have, however, been some bright spots. The city inaugurated 
innovations in transportation, including a Dial-a-bus system and 
a free dovmtown shuttle service, and it had plans for highspeed 
public transit routes. 14 Work began on four neighbourhood im-
provement areas and there v1as some increased attention given to 
revamping the development nlan. But measured against the kind 
of issues VJinnipeg faced in terms of immigration of Native people, 
declining older neighbourhoods, serious fiscal problems, develop-
ment of open space, and management of fringe development, the 
response of City government was not impressive. 
ADt~INISTRATIVE CENTRALIZATION 
It \A/Ould be vrrong hm11ever to lay the blame entirely on the 
politicians. The reorganization of the City was supposed to 
bring a new, unified admi ni strati ve system that ~tmul d be more 
effective, efficient, better able to plan and decide. And, as 
the public service is a singular power centre in its own right 
and can wield very substantial weight in the making of policy 
decisions, whatever is happening in Hinnipeg must reflect in 
large part the role of the civic administration. 
14. The election of a new Conservative administration in 
the province brought about severe cutbacks resulting.in the 
cancellation of the dual ad hoc system and the shelv1ng of the 
tn gh speed route. 
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At this stage the phasing in of completely unified services 
is complete, with fire and oolice protection being the last 
entrees in 1974. While the results of this unification are 
still difficult to fully ascertain at this time, certain 
propositions can be advanced. For example, overall the 
standard of service has not noticeably improved or declined 
as far as the average citizen is concerned. 15 
What can be concluded, though, is that the unification has been 
costly to the taxpayer. In a unified system, the standard of 
service must be roughly the same, and so must the standards of 
personnel qualifications and pay. Smaller municipalities that 
got along with limited services have now been upgraded and that 
costs money. The additional costs of local services are dif-
ficult to calculate, but it is conceded by the city administrators 
that the services cost more. 
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An even more disturbing occurrence than the increase in cost, however, 
was the high degree of centralization that has took place in the 
administration. Most local police, fire stations and civic offices 
were closed, contrary to the impression given when unification 
was proposed. The City was divided into six administrative 
15. Ibid., p.38. 
districts and one of the major complaints was that there was 
far less opportunity for the individual citizen to effect the 
operation of local services. 
This centralization was accompanied by a high degree of bureau-
cratic "stone-walling 11 • Civic administrators became notorious 
for not divulging information, for controlling the activity of 
junior members of departments in their public dealings and for 
refusing public access to information. At times the civic 
admi ni strati on of l'li nni peg gave the appearance of being defenders 
of a beleaguered fortress. 
It is not apparent either that this high degree of centralization 
resulted in more effective planning or decision-making. One 
of the major criticisms of the new administrative regime was 
the delay in processing plans for subdivision and securing 
sufficient supplies of serviced land. As a result, Winnipeg 
began to suffer a serious housing shortage and a sharp escalation 
in housing costs. The building industry blamed city administration 
. 16 
and the procedures under the Act for this. In fact the prime 
beneficiaries of the new centralized system appeared to be the 
large development firms. 
16. See Under\IJOOd, t,klellan, "Building Sites: A Prime 
Component of Housing 11 , a report prepared for the ~{innipeg House-
builders Association, 1973. 
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These administrative proble~s arose from a continuation 
of factors. Some ste~ed from the lack of strong political 
leadership and the natural inclination of hierarchical admin-
istrative systems to concentrate pm•ter. Some arose out of the 
design of the organization itself, wherein the Commission 
system of government tends toward overlap and concentration of 
authority in the hands of the chief officers of government. 
And some were a consequence of the hurried period of implementation. 
The new Winnipeg system •,vent through all of a six month transition 
period, with very little adequate preparation and orientation for 
administrators. This must be compared to the procedures followed 
in Great Britain where after passage of local government reform 
upwards of three years were prescribed for transition~ combined 
with very extensive retraining of civil servants and careful 
construction of ne\'1 internal organization structures. 17 
A consequence of the crash implementation was the limited 
attention paid to devising new management strategies or organizat-
ional procedures adequate to cope with a city of over half a 
million. The methods used by the police, fire, sanitation, public 
works departments were and still are basically the same as 
those employed before amalgamation. The only difference is that 
17. See James Lang, Alan Norton, Oo. Cit. 
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new people were grafted on. There were some new adminis-
trative wrinkles added, such as a Budget Bureau, but the 
overall method of City government remained quite old-fashioned. 
It points out that a neglected area of reform for local 
government in t·Jinnipeg v1as the development of up-to-date and 
effective management tools and procedures. Unification may have 
been a necessary first step to obtaining a modernization of 
city management, but it appeared to be the only step. 
CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT 
Finally, \1/hat about the efforts under the City of Hi nni peg Act 
to decentralize the political system and give orivate citizens 
greater involvement in their local government? The answer is 
that the regional system of thirteen community committees and 
resident advisory system played a useful but minor role in 
city government. In no way did they provide an effective 
counterweight to the centralized administrative system, and 
their influence on major Council decisions has been limited. 
Yet, in certain communities throughout the City, they served 
as forum for discussion of local issues; they provided an arena 
in \'l'hich local activists could focus their energy and at times 
they succeeded in stopping decisions for zcning changes, roadways, 
or small local developments that would have been detrimental 
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to the community. 
It is impossible in this study to cover all the facets of 
activity carried on by the community committee - RAG nebrork. 
Certain salient observations can be made on their operation, 
however. First, most Hinnipegers v1ere not even aware that 
the Community Committees or RAG 1 S existed. In a survey con-
ducted in 1973, less than 5% of citizens recalled ever having 
contact with the Ri\G 1S or Community Committees. The tota 1 
number of citizens involved in the RAG groups numbered around 
four hundred, demonstrating that they had not become vehicles 
f .d d t• . t• 18 o w1 esprea par 1c1pa 1on. 
In part, this weakness derived from the initial lack of support 
for the P~G·s by local and provincial government for any 
efforts at conversation or reaching out into the community. 
Another reason, of course, was that most citizens had no reason 
to become involved. They were generally satisfied with basic 
services and \'lere not motivated by more abstract issues of better 
planning, transportation, etc. 
The RAG 1 s and Community Committees therefore became the preserves 
of the local councillors, small groups of activist-minded 
citizens, and developers and builders who must aooear in such 
18. See ''~,1eeting the Problems and Needs of Resident Advisory 
Groups 11 , a report prepared by the Institute of Urban Studies for the 
1'4ini stry of State for Urban Affairs, Narch, 1973. 
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forums to gain a zoning variation or a subdivision approval. 
It is no coincidence, but the most active RAG groups have existed 
in older residential areas of the city which contained large 
numbers of students, professional people and oolitical activists, 
and where the battleground over high-rise development, trans-
portation through,,mys and community renewal were fought. The 
Community Committee-RAG system in the suburbs was moribund. 
Out of the more centrally located RAG-Community Committees 
however came various initiatives at neighbourhood planning. 
Several resident organizations fighting for better housing, 
improved transportation VJere spawned. This out some pressure 
on the City which responded by assigning planners to the local 
groups to help develop district plans. This process is now 
taking place in three areas of the city and shov1s some potential 
of spreading. 
On larger regional tdde issues, the impact of the local decision-
making units Nas far less successful. Early in 1972 the Community 
Committee-RAG 1 S throughout the city Nere used by citizen 9roups 
to forestall City Council proposals on railway relocation. An 
alliance v,;as formed betvve,en suburban and central city residents, 
each group acting out of different motives to oppose the plan, 
v1hich had as its aim reolacing the raih1ays vJith freeways. Council 
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stopped the plan, and nothing has yet appeared as an alternative. 
In sum, however, the transmissions line of decision-making works 
from the centre oubmrds, and the impact of private citizens 
working through the RAG fell far short of original expectations. 
In 1977, the Manitoba government substantially altered the 
Community Committee-kAG arrangement by greatly enlarging the 
population base. Because of the reduction in the size of Council 
down to twenty-seven, the Community Committees vtere reduced to 
six, serving a population base of 100,000 people. Thus, the idea 
of having small scale wards, relating to people on a relatively 
intimate basis has been eliminated. The notion of RAG 1 s being 
drawn from local neighbourhood areas has also been eroded, as they 
now cover a much wider terri tory. 
While it is too early to judge, the general expectation is that 
thfs 11 further diminish the quality of citizen involvement. 
CONCLUSION 
The story on Winnipeg 1 S reform of local government is obviously 
incomplete. ~~any years will pass before the full imolications 
of reorganization are perceived. 
There may also be significant changes in the politics of Hinnipeg. 
Public discontent with Council grew· after Unicity, caused 
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primarily by the overt fumbling by Council of major issues, 
and an annual rise in property taxes of 20%. Splits occurred 
in the ICEC and two councillors who represented older city 
wards left the caucus claiming that there was discrimination 
in favour of the suburban areas. 19 Rumblings vtere also heard 
of the need to form a coalition of non-ICEC supporters and back a 
common slate of candidates at the next election. So, it may be 
that several of the conditions described in this oaper may 
eventually be corrected through the evolution of a different 
political mood and awareness, although at this stage skepticism 
of a successful political change is in order. 
Hhatever changes may be dovm the road, \'that has happened so 
far in Hinnipeg is instructive about the kind of reform that 
emphasizes reorganization of boundaries and institutions as a 
solution to urban ailments. 
A fair conclusion is that such reform does make a difference in 
the performance and operation of a city, but often the changes 
brought about are unintended and unforeseen: Certain direct 
connections between a specific change in structure and a specific 
19. See Robert ~1atas, 11 Ghost of t1etro Lingers on Counci 1," 
The Winnipeg Tribune, November 9, 1974. 
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outcome can sometimes be well guaged. If you unify the tax base, 
there will be an elimination of disparities in the tax burden 
and a more equitable sharing of the cost of services. Also the 
competition between municipalities for industrial location is 
eliminated and there can be at least the preparation of a 
unified development plan. 
On trickier ground, are efforts to change political outcomes by 
changing boundaries and electoral systems. One objective in 
the Winnipeg reorganization was to eliminate the squabbling 
between muni ci pa 1 i ties and r1etro. The unintended result v1as to 
give a substantial political advantage to the suburban areas 
1Hhich has had a strong impact on the policies of the city. The 
cure may in this instance prove to be more severe than the 
original ailment. 
The difficulty in local government reorganization is that provincial 
governments and es1ecially nrovincial legislatures are not par-
ticularly adept at designing systems to achieve prescribed pol-
itical outcomes. No ~one can say publicly that vJe \r!ant to give 
more influence to those who are friendly to our policy goals. 
Rather the goals of local government reorganization must be 
couched in terms of better planning, efficiency, overcoming 
fragmentation. 
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Furthermore, even if the design of reorganization was to obtain 
definite political outcomes, it is an uncertain and inexact 
activity at best. The alteration of political institutions can 
have a strong impact on rechanneling political forces and 
creating different sets of political advantages for grouns in 
the community. But it is often hard to tell exactly '<'!hat the 
outcomes will be because the variables affected are so varied 
and uncontrolled. 
This suggests that reform of local government should perhaps 
address itself to more limited and selected goals, and be 
phased in over longer periods of time. It is questionable 
v1hether full-scale reorganization of local government into a 
regional system really produces such a substantial margin of 
demonstrable benefits to warrant all the time~ efforts and 
resources that are required. 
A more useful reform strategy in the area of institutional reform 
might be to target on very specific areas of change - the 
development of new channels of citizen involvement, modernization 
of urban management organizations, creation of innovative organ-
izations for specific duties, i.e. urban development cornorations, 
nationalization of urban fiscal arrangements and others. Along 
with that, a provincial government intent on promoting change within 
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a city might be better ad vi sed to adopt a strategy that would 
alter the povJer relationships in the community. Improving 
the economic well-being of disadvantaged groups, aiding in 
the organizing of unorganized groups, creating opportunities for 
community groups to assume responsibility for self-help activities, 
i.e. housing, health care, neighbourhood nlanning, thereby 
giving them a role and place in the community might be far more 
influential in changing the political performance of a city. 
But, of course, that also entails a changed situation for any 
politician at the provincial level, and they are as unlikely 
to support such moves as are city ooliticians, as it seems axiomatic 
that politicians prefer the devil you knoVJ rather than one that 
is unknovm. 
Reform of local government is a useful and sometimes necessary 
occupation. But, as the Winnipeg experience seems to demonstrate, 
it should proceed in more limited, cautious and careful fashion, 
devoid of the exaggerated expectations and claims that presently 
attach to reorganization proposals. 
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